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What we are seeing from those monasteries that support virtually anything coming out of Moscow and turn their backs on His All-Holiness Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew is not particularly difficult to explain. They claim that their opposition is theological in nature and stems from the ongoing dialogue between Constantinople and the Vatican. In reality, however, they have taken a side in the long-standing rivalry between Moscow and Constantinople over who should exercise leadership within the global Orthodox world—and they have chosen Moscow. Greece holds significant strategic value for Russian interests on multiple levels.
Russia has always maintained a strong interest in the Balkans. It has traditionally viewed the region as something akin to its own backyard, or at least as a sphere of influence to which it is naturally entitled. Shared Slavic heritage and the Orthodox faith have served as useful instruments for extending that influence. Russia’s presence is felt not only in Serbia and Bulgaria, but also in North Macedonia. In 2024, the Bulgarian Orthodox Church elected a new Patriarch, Daniil, who is widely regarded as being close to the Moscow Patriarchate. His election was highly contentious and was ultimately decided by a narrow margin, with 69 votes against 66.
In Greece, the past few years have seen heightened activity within a number of monasteries, particularly in Northern Greece. This is one of those instances where religion and politics intersect in the realities of everyday life. It was in this climate that the Niki party emerged seemingly out of nowhere in the last elections. Its rise came shortly after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine and in the wake of the clear position taken by Greece and the government of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis on the conflict.
Can the influence of these monasteries really be measured by Niki’s 3 percent share of the vote? Certainly not. It is no coincidence that pro-Russian sentiments are also reflected within a faction of New Democracy, one whose political strength is, not coincidentally, rooted in Northern Greece. It would be interesting, for example, to examine who has funded these monasteries over the years. They also maintain good relations with the party led by Kyriakos Velopoulos. Niki’s 3 percent, therefore, looks more like a demonstration of strength than a measure of the true electoral reach of the monasteries and their Russophile supporters.
At the same time, it would probably be politically disastrous for them to come out openly and declare that they no longer wish to have any connection with the Patriarchate of Constantinople! Most people do not fully understand what is actually taking place and are content to follow the guidance of their spiritual elders. Yet the reality is there for all to see. Mr. Velopoulos, for example, did not honor Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew with his presence at events held in Athens. The stated reason was the Patriarch’s dialogue with Rome.
The hostility directed at the Patriarchate of Constantinople by pro-Russian circles is ultimately rooted in Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew’s decision in 2019 to grant autocephaly to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Behind all of this lies the broader ambition of the Moscow Patriarchate to expand its role and influence within the Orthodox world.
Taken together, these developments offer some insight into the heightened attention Moscow continues to devote to Greece and to political developments in the country. Orthodox Greece remains a key element in the aspirations of the Moscow Patriarchate. Do ordinary believers truly realize that, by following the guidance of certain unofficial church circles, they may unwittingly be helping to stab the Patriarchate of Constantinople in the back?
The original article was published in the Greek daily newspaper Liberal and is republished with permission.
The post Opinion | A stab in the back of the Patriarchate of Constantinople appeared first on Orthodox Observer.
